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Abstract
The human brain has many remarkable information processing char-
acteristics that deeply puzzle scientists and engineers. Among the most
important and the most intriguing of these characteristics are the brain’s
broad universality as a learning system and its mysterious ability to dy-
namically change (reconfigure) its behavior depending on a combinatorial
number of different contexts.
This paper discusses a class of hypothetically brain-like dynamically
reconfigurable associative learning systems that shed light on the possible
nature of these brain’s properties. The systems are arranged on the general
principle referred to as the concept of E-machine.
The paper addresses the following questions:
1. How can ”dynamical” neural networks function as universal programmable
”symbolic” machines?
2. What kind of a universal programmable symbolic machine can form
arbitrarily complex software in the process of programming similar to
the process of biological associative learning?
3. How can a universal learning machine dynamically reconfigure its soft-
ware depending on a combinatorial number of possible contexts?
∗Accepted for publication in ”Progress in Computer Science Research”, Nova Science Pub-
lishers, Inc.
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The paper explains the concept of E-machine and outlines a broad range
of its potential applications. These applications include: context-sensitive
associative memory, context-dependent pattern classification, context-dependent
motor control, imitation, simulation of complex ”informal” environments
and natural language.
0 Introduction
When observed ”from the outside” the human brain seems to behave as a se-
quential symbolic machine. How else can one explain such ”clearly symbolic”
phenomena as mental computations and natural language? When observed ”from
the inside,” however, the neural networks of the brain evoke an idea of a noisy
dynamical system with distributed parameters rather than the image of a logic
circuitry of a digital computer – gradually changing potentials, decaying residual
excitation, high level of fluctuations. Neurons do produce spikes reminiscent of
the pulses in a digital computer. It is widely believed, however, that it is the
frequency of these pulses rather than their presence and absence that carry the
important information.
1. How can ”dynamical” neural networks function as universal programmable
”symbolic” machines?
2. What kind of a universal programmable symbolic machine can form arbitrar-
ily complex software in the process of programming similar to the process of
biological associative learning?
3. How can a universal learning machine dynamically reconfigure its software
depending on a combinatorial number of possible contexts?
The metaphor ”the brain as an E-machine” (Eliashberg, 1967, 1979, 1981,
1989, 1990b) sheds light on these questions. The metaphor suggests that the
brain is neither a traditional symbolic system, nor is it a traditional dynamical
system. It is a ”non-classical symbolic system” in which the probabilities of se-
quential discrete (”symbolic”) processes are controlled by the massively parallel
continuous (”dynamical”) processes.
Note. The general idea that the brain employs a combination of symbolic and
dynamical computational mechanisms was entertained in different forms by dif-
ferent researchers (Collins and Quillian, 1972; Anderson, 1976; and many others.)
The concept of E-machine is an attempt to provide a neurobiologically consistent
formalization of this general idea. The requirement of neurobiological consistency
makes a big difference!
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The paper is divided into two parts. Part I consists of the three main sections:
1. The Whole Human Brain as a Universal Learning Computer. This
section takes a broader look at the problem of information processing in
the whole human brain. It argues that there exists a relatively short for-
mal representation of a universal learning computer similar to an untrained
(unprogrammed) human brain.
2. From Associative Neural Networks to E-machines. This section es-
tablishes a link between associative neural networks and E-machines. It
connects the effects of dynamic reconfiguration (neuromodulation) in neu-
ral networks with the hypothetical states of dynamical memory available in
individual neurons. These states of ”residual-excitation-like” memory are
referred to as the E-states.
3. Molecular Interpretation of E-states: Ensembles of Protein Nanoma-
chines as Statistical Mixed-signal Computers. This section addresses
the problem of a neurobiological implementation of the E-sates and the next
E-state procedures. It describes a formalism that connects the dynamics of
macroscopic E-states with the statistical conformational dynamics of ensem-
bles of protein molecules (such as ion channels) embedded in neural mem-
branes. A single protein molecule is treated as a probabilistic nanomachine,
and the E-states are interpreted as the average numbers of such nanoma-
chines in different states – the average occupation numbers. The formal-
ism suggests that it is the statistical conformational dynamics of protein
molecules in individual neurons rather than the collective statistical dynam-
ics of neural networks that performs the main volume of the brain hardware
computations. There is not enough neurons in the whole human brain to
implement the required amount of computations in the networks built from
”simple neurons.”
Part II includes the following main sections:
4. Computing with E-states. This section tackles the question as to how the
massively parallel transformations of E-states allow a slow brain to efficiently
process large arrays of symbolic data stored in its long-term memory (LTM)
without moving this data into a read/write memory buffer.
5. Hierarchical structure: sparse-recoding, data compression and sta-
tistical filtering. This section explains how E-machines with hierarchi-
cal structure of associative memory can perform efficient data compres-
sion, context-dependent statistical filtering, and context-dependent gener-
alization.
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6. Discussion
1 TheWhole Human Brain as a Universal Learn-
ing Computer
This section takes a broader look at the problem of information processing in the
whole human brain. It argues that there exists a relatively short formal represen-
tation of a universal learning computer similar to an untrained (unprogrammed)
human brain.
1.1 System (Man,World) as a composition of two ”ma-
chines”
Consider a cognitive system (W,D,B) schematically shown in Figure 1, where W
is an external world, D is a set of human-like sensory and motor devices, and B
is a hypothetical computing system simulating the work of the human nervous
system. One can think of system (D,B) as a human-like robot. From the system-
theoretical viewpoint, it is useful to divide system (W,D,B) into two subsystems:
(W,D) and B, where (W,D) is the external world as it appears to the brain B
via devices D. In this representation, both subsystems can be treated as abstract
”machines”, the inputs of B being the outputs of (W,D) and vice versa.
For the sake of simplicity, I refer to B as the brain. At this general level, the
rest of the nervous system can be treated as a part of block D. Let B(t) denote
the state of B at time t, where t=0 corresponds to the beginning of learning. I
argue that the following general propositions are true:
Sensorimotor devices
W D B
World Robot
External system Brain
Figure 1: System (Robot,World) as a composition of two machines
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1. There exists a relatively short formal representation of B(0). This represen-
tation is encoded in the human genome and can be small enough to fit into
a single floppy disk.
2. No special mathematical formalism is needed to describe the work of B(0).
Given a powerful enough hardware, a relatively small C or C++ program
would be able to simulate the work of B(0) with a time step of, say, 1msec.
This program would be sufficient to adequately represent all important psy-
chological characteristics of B(0). A more complex, but still rather small C
or C++ program would be able to simulate the work of B(0) with a time
step of, say, 1µsec. This program would be sufficient to adequately rep-
resent all important psychological characteristics of B(0) and many of its
neurobiological characteristics.
3. There exists a relatively short formal representation of the sensorimotor
devices, D, since this representation is encoded in the human genome. The
metaphorical floppy disk mentioned in item 1 has enough room for both
B(0) and D. We know that B(0) can do well with different kinds of artificial
devices, so the main secret is in B(0) rather than in D.
4. In the general case, there exists no finite formal representation of system
(W,D) – this system can be infinitely complex. This doesn’t prevent one from
simulating the behavior of system (W,D,B), because the ”robot” (D,B) has
a finite formal representation, and the external world, W, is ”always there”
to experiment with.
5. Any formal representation of B(t) for a big t (say, t>10 years) must be
very long (terabytes?) – this representation must include in some form
a representation of the brain’s individual experience which resulted from
interaction with (W,D). Whatever language is used for the representation
of B(t), the main part of this representation is the representation of the
knowledge accumulated in the course of learning. Figuratively speaking, the
human brain works as a ”complexity sucker” that gets most if its complexity
from system (W,D).
6. The knowledge is represented in B(t) in a rather ”raw” form – the brain’s
learning algorithm is close to ”memorizing raw sensory-motor-emotional ex-
perience.” No special data structures are needed. Instead of pre-processing
data before putting it in memory, the brain uses a powerful massively par-
allel decision-making procedure capable of processing the ”raw” experience
on the fly depending on context.
7. It is practically impossible to understand B(t) without understanding B(0)
and studying the process of learning that changes B(0) into B(t).
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8. It is practically impossible to formally represent and simulate nontrivial
parts of the behavior of system (W,D,B(t)) without having an adequate
formal representation of B(t). That is, an adequate cognitive theory cannot
be separated from the theory of the brain.
9. The main goal of brain modelling must be reverse engineering B(0). This
is a clearly defined and practically achievable goal. (I refer to this re-
verse engineering project as the Brain Zero or the Brain 0 project. Visit
www.brain0.com.) To advance toward this goal one should concentrate on
the analysis of basic psychological and neurobiological observations rather
than on the mimicking of the parts of the brain’s behavior. The latter strat-
egy leads one into the ”new-effect-new-model” pitfall and is cursed by the
combinatorial explosion of the number of partial models needed to represent
the whole behavior.
10. The role of B(0) in cognitive science can be meaningfully compared with the
role of the Maxwell equations in the classical electrodynamics. The same
Maxwell equations (a metaphorical counterpart of B(0)) coupled with an
infinite variety of specific external constraints (a metaphorical counterpart
of (W,D)) allow one to simulate infinite variety of specific classical electro-
magnetic phenomena. Similarly, the same B(0) interacting with different
external systems (W,D) would allow one to simulate, in principle, infinite
variety of arbitrarily complex cognitive phenomena.
1.2 The Maxwell equations metaphor: the pitfall of a ”pure
phenomenology”
The example of physics warns us that one should not underestimate the power of
simple basic mechanisms of Mother Nature. I argue that this warning is relevant
to the problem of reverse engineering the ”physical” system B(0). The brain is
designed by Mother Nature – not by the human system engineers. This makes all
the difference in the world.
We (humans) design artificial information processing systems to make them
easier to understand, test and debug. This costs us extra resources. In contrast,
Mother Nature tends to solve natural design problems with minimum resources. It
makes Her designs look clever. It also makes them difficult to understand. In such
minimum-resource designs different functions are necessarily strongly integrated
and cannot be easily structured as independent blocks.
An integration of a set of simple physical principles can produce a ”critical
mass” effect. The introduction of the so-called ”displacement current” in the
Maxwell equations gives a classical example of this interesting phenomenon. All
of a sudden, this simple addition to the set of known basic laws of electricity and
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magnetism, allowed J.C. Maxwell to create his famous equations that cover the
whole range of arbitrarily complex classical electromagnetic phenomena.
I argue that something similar had happened in the case of the human brain.
Not too much was needed to transform the brains of simple animals into the human
brain. A clever integration of a relatively small set of powerful ”basic mechanisms”
produced a ”critical mass” effect.
To understand the pitfall of a ”pure phenomenology” consider the following
metaphor. Imagine a physicist who wants to simulate the behavior of electro-
magnetic field in a complex microwave device, e.g., the Stanford Linear Accel-
erator (SLAC). Assume that this physicist doesn’t know about the existence of
the Maxwell equations and, even more importantly, doesn’t believe that the com-
plex behavior he observes may have something to do with such simple equations.
(In the AI jargon this physicist would be called ”scruffy.” If he believed in the
existence of the basic equations he would be called ”neat.”)
So this ”scruffy physicist” sets out to do a purely phenomenological computer
simulation of the observed complex behavior per se. Anyone who was involved
in the computer simulation of the behavior of electromagnetic field in a linear
accelerator can easily predict the results of this gedanken experiment.
In the best case scenario, the above mentioned scruffy physicist comes up with
a computer program (with a large number of empirical parameters) capable of
simulating the behavior of electromagnetic field in a very narrow range. This
computer program has no extrapolating power and is not accepted by the SLAC
community as a theory of a linear accelerator.
Note that it would be impossible to reverse engineer the Maxwell equations (a
metaphorical counterpart of B(0)) from the analysis of the behavior of electromag-
netic field in such a complex ”external world” as SLAC. I argue that, similarly, it
is impossible to reverse engineer B(0) from the analysis of such complex cognitive
phenomena in system (W,D,B(t)) as playing chess, solving complex mathematical
problems, story telling, etc.
1.3 Basic observations
To formulate some ”technical requirements” to an adequate model of B(0) con-
sider the following basic observations:
OBSERVATION 1. A person with a sufficiently large external memory aid
(for example, a sheet of paper divided into squares) can perform, in principle, any
effective computational procedure. A formalization of this observation had lead
famous English mathematician Alan Turing (1936) to the invention of his cele-
brated machine and to the corresponding formalization of the intuitive notion of
an algorithm. (See Minsky, 1967, for a relevant discussion of Turing’s ideas.)
Now that the concept of an algorithm is defined, we can say that a model of
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system (W,D,B), where W is and external memory aid, must be a universal com-
puting system. (This is a necessary but, of course, not a sufficient, requirement.)
OBSERVATION 2. We are not born with the knowledge of all possible al-
gorithms. We can learn, however, to perform, in principle, any given algorithm,
say, by simulating the work of a Turing machine representing this algorithm.
This observation means that the above system (W,D,B) must be a universal
learning system.
OBSERVATION 3. A person with a good visual memory performing compu-
tations with the use of an external memory aid learns to perform similar mental
computations using the corresponding imaginary memory aid. A chess player
learns to move chess pieces on an imaginary chess board. An abacus user learns
to operate on an imaginary abacus (Baddeley, 1980). And so on. In principle, a
person can learn to perform any mental computations by mentally simulating the
process of writing symbols on a sheet of paper.
Ignoring some severe, but theoretically unimportant limitations on the size of
the working space available via this mechanism of mental imagery, this observa-
tion suggests that the human brain, B, itself – not just a person with an external
memory aid – must be treated by a system theorist as a universal learning system.
Note. An adequate model of B(0) must have the highest general level of comput-
ing power. Attempting to simulate the work of the human brain using a learning
system with the general level of computing power lower than that of the brain can
be compared with an attempt to design a Perpetual Motion machine in violation
of the energy conservation law. No matter how sophisticated a learning process
might be, no system can learn to do what it cannot do in principle. (An elephant
learns to fly only in a Disney film.)
OBSERVATION 4. We (humans) can imagine new sensory events and syn-
thesize new motor reactions. At the same time we can remember and recall the
real sequence of events (reactions). For example, an experienced chess player can
mentally play any chess party. At the same time he/she can recall the real par-
ties he/she played. Similarly, we can generate a combinatorial number of new
sentences. At the same time we can read by heart a specific text we’ve learned.
What kind of learning algorithm can accommodate these different types of learn-
ing? Do we need different learning algorithms?
OBSERVATION 5. We memorize new information with the references to the
pieces of the information which we already have in our long-term memory (LTM).
The more we know in a certain area the easier it is to remember new things related
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to this area. For example, we can easily remember long sentences in the language
we know. It is next to impossible to remember long sentences in a language we
don’t know. It is also very difficult, for a second language speaker, to get rid of
the accent, because he/she tends to build the words of the second language from
the syllables of the first language.
How can this hierarchical referencing system be implemented in neural net-
works?
OBSERVATION 6. Our ability to retain information in our short-term memory
(STM) increases if similar information is present in our LTM. We can repeat a
sentence in the language we know. We cannot repeat a sentence in a language we
don’t know. We can imitate only those reactions of other people that we can do
ourselves. The same is true for perception. We have difficulties recognizing words
of a foreign language that we cannot pronounce ourselves.
What is STM? How does it interact with LTM? What is working memory?
What does motor control have to do with it?
OBSERVATION 7. To imagine different sensory events we need to do men-
tal motor reactions that would cause similar events. We need to mentally sing a
melody to imagine another person singing this melody. We need to mentally say
a sentence to imagine another person saying this sentence. Etc.
What is mental imagery? How does mental imagery interact with motor con-
trol?
OBSERVATION 8. We can see different sub-pictures in the same picture de-
pending on what we expect to see. The Necker cube is an example. We can hear
different tunes in the same sequence of sounds (e.g., the sounds produced by a
moving train) depending on what we expect (want) to hear.
What kind of mechanism available in neural networks can account for these
phenomena of mental set?
OBSERVATION 9. We can selectively tune our attention to a voice we want
to hear in a noisy room – the so called cocktail party phenomenon.
How can the brain temporarily increase sensitivity to signals with some not
easily definable characteristics?
OBSERVATION 10. Our short-term memory can retain only a limited number
(seven plus or minus two) of items: the ”magical number” of Miller, 1956. How-
ever, due to the effect of ”chunking” the size of a single item can be significantly
increased. We also can ”see more than we can report” ( Sperling, 1960) . This
raises the same set of questions as the Observation 6.
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OBSERVATION 11. The brain is a slow and noisy system. It cannot pro-
cess symbolic information in a traditional (”classical”) way by moving symbols
in a read/write memory buffer. Nevertheless, we can learn to mentally simulate
different external systems (W,D) with the properties of a read/write memory.
(For example, we can mentally move chess pieces on an imaginary chess board or
mentally write and erase symbols on an imaginary sheet of paper.)
How can computational universality in Turing’s sense (Chomsky’s type 0) be
achieved without moving symbols in a read/write memory? How can neural net-
works learn to simulate a symbolic read/write memory?
Note. The problem of how the brain can learn to simulate an external system
(W,D) with the properties of a read/write memory must not be confused with the
problem of how a neural network can implement a read/write memory. The lat-
ter problem is trivial. The former problem is nontrivial and critically important.
Traditional neural network models cannot learn to simulate external systems with
the properties of a read/write memory and, therefore, cannot serve as models of
the brain’s systems responsible for mental imagery.
OBSERVATION 12. We can recognize that a certain object, A, is statistically
strongly correlated with another object, B. We can also produce a reaction, R,
statistically well correlated with a certain stimulus, S. Importantly, this statistical
relationship depends on context. Two objects strongly correlated in one context
may be not correlated at all in a different context. Our language has words usual,
unusual, common, uncommon, etc., that reflect our ability to recognize statistical
relationships.
How can a huge amount of computations required for context-dependent sta-
tistical processing be done ”on the fly” by slow neural networks? (Note that it
must be done ”on the fly,” because context can change very rapidly. This statis-
tics cannot be precalculated, because there is a combinatorial number of possible
contexts!)
OBSERVATION 13. We can wait for a certain object, A. Once A appears
we recognize that A is the object we were waiting for. If we expect a certain ob-
ject, B, to appear and, instead, an unexpected object, C, appears we recognize
that C is an unexpected object. We can answer the questions: ”What are you
waiting for? What do you expect?”
How does the brain temporarily mark an object as an object ”being waited for”
or as an object ”being expected?”
OBSERVATION 14. Pattern recognition is a context-dependent activity. Con-
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sider the question: ”What is it?” In the context of this question a person behaves
as a pattern classifier. He/she can answer, for example that this is a book. The
person’s brain was able to distinguish a book from other objects, say, a box, a
disk drive, etc. Now consider the instruction: ”Take this.” In this context it is no
longer important that the object has the name book. What is important is the
object’s size, weight, position, etc. The experience acquired while ”taking a book”
is applicable to ”taking a box” and ”taking a disk drive.” That is, the same object
is treated as a member of different classes depending on context.
How can a context-dependent pattern classification be done ”on the fly?”
OBSERVATION 15. We can recognize our emotional states. We remember
our emotional experience. We use this experience to evaluate new events. Our
concepts of good, bad, important, unimportant, etc. are formed in the process of
learning.
How do we learn to recognize our emotions? How does our emotional memory
interact with other types of memory?
OBSERVATION 16. We can recognize internal states and internal reactions
of other people. We can say, for example, ”I know how you feel.” We know that
another person is thinking, waiting, etc. When we learn by imitating another per-
son, we are not imitating this person as a black box. This means that the problem
of learning cannot be formalized as the automata theory problem of one machine
deciphering the structure of another machine observed as a black box. (If this
formalization were true, we wouldn’t be able to learn, in principle, a behavior of
the Chomsky’s type 2 and higher.)
How do we learn to control our internal reactions? How do we learn the names
of our internal reactions (thinking, imagining, recalling, waiting, seeing, listening,
etc.)? How do we recognize similar internal reactions in other people?
How does mental imagery interact with perception?
OBSERVATION 17. Much of what we see we see from our memory. For
example, when we are driving a car in a familiar environment we need only to
glance at the scene to update the visual picture we expect. We can close our eyes
and see the room we live in by mentally moving the eyes and mentally turning the
head.
How do the signals coming from external system (W,D) interact with the signals
coming from memory? How is our mental imagery synchronized with the external
system (W,D)? What does motor control have to do with it?
11
1.4 Motor control and mental imagery
Let us expand the structure of system (W,D,B) of Figure 1 as shown in Figure 2.
The brain B is divided into two blocks: AM and NM, where AM is an associative
learning system that forms Sensory,Motor → Motor (SM→M) associations, and
NM is a set of motor centers. The diagram also depicts the block TEACHER.
In this case, the teacher acts as an idealized neurophysiologists, who can produce
any desired output of centers NM, by ”clamping” these centers. System AM re-
ceives sensory signals from system (W,D) and motor signals from the output of
centers NM. This approach to teaching and learning is similar to the so-called su-
pervised learning, except that, in our case, the learning system receives its sensory
input from the external system (W,D) rather than from the teacher. This can be
compared with the so-called instrumental conditioning. Let us make the further
Motor control
associations
W D AM
Teacher
NM
M
S
M
M
SM       M
Figure 2: The concept of forced motor training
Teacher
associations
associations
MS       SS
S
NS
W D
AM
NM
M
S
M
Motor control
M
AS
S
M
Mental imagery
SM       M
Figure 3: Mental imagery as a simulation of the external system (W,D)
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expansion of the structure of system (W,D,B) as shown in Figure 3. The brain
B is now divided into four blocks: AS, AM, NS and NM, where blocks AM and
NM are the same as in Figure 2, NS are sensory centers, and AS is an associative
learning system that forms Motor,Sensory → Sensory (MS→S) associations.
The goal of system AM is to simulate the block TEACHER. The goal of system
AS is to simulate the external system (W,D). It is easy to see that system (W,D)
plays the same role for system AS as the block TEACHER does for AM. We
will view systems AM and AS as the systems responsible for motor control and
mental imagery, respectively. We will view the sets of (SM→M) and (MS →S)
associations as the brain’s software associated with the above functions.
1.5 Mental computations (thinking) as an interaction be-
tween motor control and mental imagery
A specific example of system (W,D,B) shown in Figure 4 gives a simplified general
explanation of the phenomenon of mental computations. The model was imple-
mented as an educational program, called EROBOT, for the Microsoft Windows.
(The program can be purchased from www.brain0.com.) An explicit description
of this model was given in Eliashberg (2003). In Figure 4
• W is an external memory aid (the tape divided into squares).
• D is a set of devices including the eye, the hand and the speech organ.
• B is the brain divided into four blocks AM, AS, NM and NS that have the
same general meaning as in Figure 3.
The robot’s devices, D, allow it to simulate the work of any Turing machine by
performing the following elementary operations:
1. read a symbol from the single square scanned by the eye
2. write a symbol into the scanned square
3. move the eye and the hand simultaneously to the next square, the next
square being the one to the left, the one to the right, or the same square
4. utter a symbol to be kept in mind for one cycle – this one-cycle memory is
provided by the delayed feedback between the motor signal, utter symbol,
to the speech organ and the proprioceptive signal, symbol uttered, from this
organ.
An experiment with the model consists of two stages: training and examination.
At the stage of training the teacher forces the robot (by acting on its motor
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utter symbol
motor devices
2
1
3
1
2
SM       M
External system (W,D) The brain
W D
External world
A
X X
A
Teacher
NM
symbol read
symbol uttered
NS
symbol read
symbol from memory
symbol written
move
symbol from eye
eye position
Tape
AS
AM
associations
MS       S
associations
write symbol
Sensory and
Figure 4: Mental computations as interaction between motor control and mental
imagery
centers) to perform several examples of a specified algorithm with different input
data presented on tape. (The parenthesis checker algorithm borrowed from Minsky
(1967) is used as a built-in example in the program EROBOT.)
The following results of learning are achieved:
1. System AM learns to simulate the teacher, so the robot can perform the
demonstrated algorithm with any input data without the help of the teacher.
2. In the case of a finite tape, and a sufficient number of training examples, sys-
tem AS learns to simulate the external system (W,D). Accordingly, the robot
learns to perform the demonstrated algorithm with the use of an imaginary
memory aid. (The robot keeps writing symbols on the real tape to show
what it calculates on the imaginary tape. The robot doesn’t see the real
tape!)
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1.6 The pitfall of a ”smart” learning algorithm
The main part of today’s research in learning is devoted to the development and
study of what can be referred to as ”smart” learning algorithms. Such algo-
rithms attempt to create ”optimal” representations of the learner’s experience in
the learner’s memory. I argue that this general approach (whatever interesting
and important from the engineering and mathematical viewpoints) cannot be em-
ployed by a universal learning system similar to the human brain. The catch is
that a smart learning algorithm aimed at a ”single-context” optimization is not
universal. While optimizing performance in a selected context, it throws away a
lot of information needed in a variety of other contexts.
Consider, for example, Observation 14 form Section 1.3. This observation sug-
gests that, in the case of the human brain, there is no such thing as an optimal
context-independent classification. The main issue is not ”how” to pre-process
information in the course of learning (Hebbian learning, backpropagation, simu-
lated annealing, etc.), and how to store this pre-processed information in memory
(distributed, local, synaptic, optical, etc.), but ”what” information to learn. The
human concepts of ”good”, ”bad”, ”important”, and ”unimportant” change with
experience. Therefore, a ”smart” learning algorithm with a fixed criterion of opti-
mality – the criterion that is not affected by the contents of data – cannot serve as
an adequate metaphor for human learning. What seems unimportant today may
become important tomorrow when new information is acquired.
I argue that a really smart universal learning system – such as B(0) – must use
a ”dumb” but universal learning algorithm. Instead of doing much pre-processing
of data before placing it in memory, such system must use an efficient decision-
making (data interpretation) procedure to process ”raw experience” dynamically
(on the fly) depending on context. Theoretically, a powerful enough interpretation
procedure can always make up for a ”dumb” learning algorithm as long as this
algorithm doesn’t lose data. In contrast, no decision making procedure can make
up for a ”smart” learning algorithm that throws away a lot of information. The
loss of data is irremediable.
2 From Associative Neural Networks to E-machines
This section introduces the concept of a primitive E-machine (Eliashberg, 1979)
as a natural information processing extension of the notion of a homogeneous
associative neural network. A complex E-machine is a system built from several
primitive E-machines. Complex E-machines will be discussed in Part II of this
paper.
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2.1 Simple example of associative neural network: Model
ANN-0
Consider a neural network schematically shown in Figure 5. The functional model
of this network described in this section will be referred to as Model ANN-0
(Associative Neural Network # 0).
In Figure 5, large circles with incoming and outgoing lines represent neurons
with their dendrites and axons, respectively. Small white and black circles repre-
sent excitatory and inhibitory synapses, respectively. The network has three layers
of neurons: input neurons N1, intermediate neurons N2, and output neurons N3.
Neurons N2 have a global inhibitory feedback via neuron N4 and local excitatory
feedbacks. It will be shown that in this network neurons N2 can compete via
reciprocal inhibition in the winner–take–all fashion. A similar effect can be ob-
tained in a network with lateral inhibitory feedbacks. Figure 5 uses the following
notation:
• Nk[j] is the j-th neuron from set Nk.
• Smk[i, j] is the synapse between neuron Nk[j] and neuron Nm[i].
• xj is the output of neuron N1[j].
• gxij is the gain of synapse S21[ij].
Teacher
N1 S21[ij]
N3
N4
q
CHOICEN2
α
τ
β
ENCODING
(Output LTM)
DECODING
(Input LTM)
x1
xj
xm
gijx
xinh
ui
sniss1
r1 ri rn
gkiy
y1
yk
yp
Figure 5: Simple example of associative neural network
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• si is the net synaptic current of synapses S21[i, 1], . . . S21[i,m] – si represents
a similarity between input vector x and vector gxi (expression (1)).
• ri is the output of neuron N2[i].
• q is the output of neuron N4. This output is the sum of the feedback signal
β
∑
ri and an external signal xinh.
• β is the gain of synapse between any neuron from N2 and neuron N4.
• τ is the time constant of any neuron from N2.
• α is the gain of synapse providing local excitatory feedback for a neuron
from N2.
• gyki is the gain of synapse between neuron N2[i] and neuron N3[k].
The following functional model of the network of Figure 5 was studied in Eliashberg
(1967, 1979). In this model a neuron is treated as a linear threshold element with
zero threshold and the time constant τ . In spite of its simplicity, this model
has a significant educational value because it allows one to explicitly bridge the
gap between its neurobiological and psychological theories and to show what kind
of mathematics is involved in this bridging. No learning algorithm is described,
and it is assumed that the model is preprogrammed before the beginning of an
experiment.
si =
m∑
j=1
gxij · xj (1)
τ
dui
dt
+ ui = si + α · ri − q (2)
ri =
{
ui if ui > 0
0 otherwise
(3)
q = β
n∑
i=i
ri + xinh (4)
yk =
n∑
i=1
gyki · ri (5)
Let all xj and xinh (and, therefore, all si) be step functions of time. Then, for
all active neurons from layer N2 – the neurons for which ui > 0 – the solution of
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equations (2)–(4) can be represented in the following explicit form:
ui =
(si − sav)
α− 1
(eat − 1) + (u0i − u
0
av)e
at
+
(sav − xinh)
1 + β · n1 − α
(1− e−bt) + u0av · e
−bt
(6)
where
• n1 is the number of active neurons from N2.
• u0i (i = 1, . . . n) are the values of ui at t=0.
• sav and u
0
av are the average values of si and u
0
i for all active neurons from
N2.
sav =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si (7)
u0av =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
u0i (8)
Parameters a and b in eat and e−bt are as follows:
a = (α− 1)/τ (9)
b = (1 + β · n1 − α)/τ (10)
Let 1 < α < 1 + β. Then a > 0. According to expression (6), neurons N2[i]
with si > sav increase their potentials ui. Neurons N2[i] with si < sav decrease
their potentials and switch off once ui < 0. This reduces n1 and increases sav
making si < sav for some additional neurons from N2. Eventually, only neurons
with si = max(s1, . . . sn) will have ui > 0. It can be shown that this equilibrium is
unstable if ni > 1. Therefore, in the presence of noise, at the end of the transient
response there will be only one winner randomly selected from the set of neurons
with the maximum level of si.
2.2 Model ANN-0 as a symbolic machine
Let us introduce a finite (”psychological”) time step ∆t ≫ τ , and let us assume
that inputs change step-wise at moments tν and tν +∆t/2, where
tν = ν ·∆t ν = 0, 1, . . . (11)
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xj(t) =
{
xj(ν) for t ∈ (tν , tν +∆t/2]
0 otherwise
(12)
Let us introduce a periodic inhibition
xinh =
{
x0inh if t ∈ (tν , tν +∆t/2]
0 otherwise
(13)
Let us sample outputs at the end of the first half of each cycle
yk(ν) = yk(tν +∆t/2) (14)
Let us assume that the the states of ILTM and OLTM are specified at the begin-
ning of an experiment with the model and don’t change during the experiment
(the model is preprogrammed in advance and no learning takes place during the
experiment). Let us also assume that the parameters of the model are the same
for all experiments. To describe the ”psychological” properties of Model ANN-0
we need the following system theoretical concepts.
DEFINITIONS:
• A (deterministic) combinatorial machine is a system M=(X,Y,f), where
X and Y are finite sets of symbols, called the input and the output set
(or alphabet) of M, respectively; f : X → Y is the output function of M.
Machine M works as follows: yν = f(xν), where xν ∈ X and yν ∈ Y are the
input and the output symbols at the ν-th cycle.
• A probabilistic combinatorial machine is a system M=(X,Y,δ), where X
and Y are the same as above; δ : X ×Y → [0, 1] is the function of output
conditional probabilities of M. Machine M works as follows:
P{yν = b | xν = a} = δ(a, b), where xν , a ∈ X and yν, b ∈ Y and P{B | A}
is the conditional probability of B given A.
• Machine M1 simulates (is equivalent to) machine M2 if these two machines
cannot be distinguished from each other by observing their inputs and out-
puts (observing them as black boxes).
The following properties of Model ANN-0 – with the inputs and outputs described
by expressions 11, 12, 13, 14 – can be proved (Eliashberg, 1979):
1. Let X and Y be finite subsets of the sets of input an output vectors of the
model, respectively. Let x¯(ν) ∈ X and y¯(ν) ∈ Y. Let f s : X × X → R
be the similarity function from expression (1)– in this case f s is the scalar
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product. Let the pair (X, f s) satisfy the following correct decoding condition
∀x, x′ ∈ X (if x 6= x′ then f s(x, x′) < f s(x, x)) (15)
For any combinatorial machine M = (X,Y, f) there exists a state, g, of the
LTM of the model (and some fixed values of parameters of the model) such
that the model in the state g simulates (is equivalent to) machine M.
2. The previous result extends to any probabilistic combinatorial machine (X,Y,δ)
with rational probabilities δ.
2.3 Model AF-0: A trivial primitive E-machine correspond-
ing to Model ANN-0
The ”psychological” properties of Model ANN-0 can be described in algorithmic
terms. The description presented below gives an example of a trivial primitive
E-machine – a primitive E-machine without E-states. This model will be referred
to as Model AF-0 (Associative Field # 0).
Notation
In this paper I use a C-like notation mixed with scientific-like notation to represent
models of E-machines aimed at humans. (I use C++ for computer simulation.) I
use special notation for the following operations:
• A := {a|P (a)} select the set of elements a with the property P (a). I
use Pascal-like notation ”:=” to emphasize the dynamic character of this
operation.
• a :∈ A select an element a from the set A at random with equal probability.
DECODING: compare input vector with all vectors in Input LTM
for(i = 1; i <= n; i++) s[i] = Similarity(x[∗], gx[∗][i]); (1)
CHOICE: select the set of locations with the maximum value of s[i]
MAXSET := {i | s[i] = max(s[1], . . . s[n])}; (2)
randomly select a winner (win) from MAXSET
win :∈MAXSET ; (3)
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ENCODING: read output vector from the selected location, win, of Out-
put LTM
if(s[win] > xinh) y[∗] = gy[∗][win]; else y[∗] = NULL; (4)
Comments:
1. As long as the Similarity() function and the set of allowable inputs, X, sat-
isfy the correct decoding condition (expression (15) with f s = Similarity),
Model AF-0 is a system universal with respect to the class of combinatorial
machines.
2. The psychological Model AF-0 is much simpler than the neurobiological
model ANN-0. Model AF-0 doesn’t have all the neural-implementation-
parameters of model ANN-0. It also doesn’t have the fast changing (neuro-
biological) state u.
3. In the next sections Model AF-0 will be enhanced in several directions.
(a) Adding a one-cycle delayed feedback from y to x. This will change
model AF-0 into a system universal with respect to the class of state
machines.
(b) Adding a universal learning algorithm. The new model will become a
learning system universal with respect to the class of finite-state ma-
chines.
(c) Introducing E-state arrays, a next E-state procedure, and a Structural
LTM (SLTM). This will transform Model AF-0 into a nontrivial primi-
tive E-machine capable of producing some interesting effects of working
memory and temporal context (mental set).
(d) Introducing associative inputs and outputs. This enhancement will al-
low us to get effects of sparse re-coding, data compression and context-
dependent statistical filtering.
2.4 Delayed feedback and simulation of finite-state ma-
chines
DEFINITION
A (deterministic) finite–state machine is a system M = (X,Y,S, α, ω), where X
and Y are finite sets of external symbols of M called the input and the output sets
(alphabets), respectively, S is a finite set of internal symbols of M called the state
set, ω : X×S→ Y is a function called the output function of M, α : X×S→ S is
a function called the next-state function of M. The work of machine M is described
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Figure 6: Finite–state machine as a combinatorial machine with a one-cycle de-
layed feedback
by the following expressions: sν+1 = α(xν , sν), and yν = ω(xν , sν), where x ∈ X,
y ∈ Y, and s ∈ S are the values of input, output, and state variables at the
moment ν, respectively.
Note. There are different equivalent formalizations of the concept of a finite–
state machine. The formalization described above is known as a Mealy machine.
Another popular formalization is a Moore machine. In a Moore machine the
output is described as a function of the next–state. Practical electronic designers
usually use the term state machine instead of the term finite–state machine. Any
finite–state machine can be implemented as a combinatorial machine with a one
cycle delayed feedback (see Figure 6). Using this trick, it is easy to show that
Model AF-0 with a delayed feedback can simulate any finite–state machine.
2.5 Introducing a universal learning algorithm
Let us return to the system (W,D,B) shown in Figure 4. Simple as it is, Model
AF-0 has enough computing power to serve as the motor control system AM, be-
cause the one-cycle delayed feedback ”utter-symbol→ symbol-uttered” transforms
block AM into a system universal with respect to the class of finite machines (as
explained in the previous section). This gives the system (W,D,B) the power of
a universal Turing machine. (A Turing machine is a finite–state machine coupled
with an external tape through the I/O device called the head. The block (W,D)
provides the functionality of the tape and the head of this machine.)
What kind of learning algorithm does the Model AF-0 need to be able to learn
to simulate any combinatorial machine?
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It is easy to show that the simplest algorithm satisfying this requirement is ”tape-
recording” the X- sequence and the Y-sequence in the Input and Output LTM,
respectively. In the case of a deterministic combinatorial machine, this algorithm
can be improved by recording only new associations. In the case of a probabilistic
combinatorial machine the same associations need to be recorded several times to
accumulate statistics.
In phenomenological terms, the above tape recording algorithm can be de-
scribed as follows:
BOOL wen; //write enable: auxiliary input variable
int wptr; // write pointer: auxiliary state variable
if(wen) {gx[∗][wptr] = x[∗]; gy[∗][wptr] = y[∗]; wptr ++; } (5)
It is interesting to mention that some famous psychiatrists were advocating
this concept of tape-recording-learning. Here is a quotation from Meynert (1884):
”Each new impression meets a new, still vacant cell. With the existence of such
vast number of these vacant cells, impressions arriving in succession find carriers
in which they will remain forever in the same close order”.
As mentioned in 1.6, the concept of a ”smart” learning algorithm creates a
methodological pitfall. The catch is that the human concept of important infor-
mation changes with experience, so no learning algorithm with a fixed criterion of
optimality can be smart enough to know in advance which information is impor-
tant to store and which is not. What seems unimportant today may become very
important tomorrow where more information is acquired.
I argue that there is no special magic in how the knowledge is stored in the
brain (distributed, local, analog, digital, etc.). The magic is in what knowledge is
stored and how this knowledge is processed dynamically depending on context.
2.6 ”Symbolic” or ”nonsymbolic,” that is the question
Starting with the neural network shown in Figure 5, one can proceed in two
different directions:
1. When the neurons in layer N2 compete in a winner-take-all fashion (1 < α <
1 + β), the Model ANN-0 can be thought of as a neural counterpart of the
Programmable Logic Array (PLA) shown in Figure 7. The input synaptic
matrix (Input LTM) is similar to the programmable AND–array, and the
output synaptic matrix (Output LTM) is similar to the programmable OR–
array. If one goes in this direction one gets some ”neural extras,” such
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Figure 7: Programmable Logic Array (PLA)
as a generalization by similarity and the ability to simulate probabilistic
combinatorial machines. Taking this path, eventually, brings one to the
concept of a primitive E-machine.
2. If one reduces the competition of neurons in layer N2, one enters the realm
of connectionist neural networks. Let us set α = β = 0. Let us also replace
the linear threshold output function by a sigmoid function. Model ANN-0
becomes a typical Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) system. In the tra-
ditional connectionist graphical representation, this system looks like shown
in Figure 8.
N3
x
y
N1
N2
Figure 8: Associative neural network as a ”connectionist” system
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If one selects this ”nonsymbolic” path, one is inspired to view neural net-
works as analog computational devices implementing multidimensional map-
pings f : Rm → Rn, where R is the set of real numbers. It is seldom possible
to find the weights, corresponding to nontrivial multidimensional mappings,
analytically. Therefore the development and study of the learning algo-
rithms, automatically adjusting the weights, becomes the main thrust of
this research. (There is plenty of room in multidimensional real spaces, so
one can spent one’s life searching for the ”magical neural mappings.”)
Which way to go? I argue that the first direction is the right way to go if one
is interested in biological brain. The second approach has the following liabilities
(each of which is sufficient to disqualify this approach as an adequate biological
framework):
1. The learning algorithms used in PDP models (such as backpropagation,
simulated annealing, etc.) are not universal. (See Rumelhart, McClelland,
et al (1986) for the explanation of the PDP framework.)
2. Traditional PDP models don’t have a sufficient general level of computing
power to adequately address such critically important ”symbolic” problems
as the problem of natural language. (See Pinker and Mehler (1988) for a
discussion of this issue.)
3. PDP models provide no satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of work-
ing memory and mental set. They are largely inconsistent with Observations
1-17 from Section 1.5.
4. Biological neural networks don’t have the accuracy needed to implement
traditional PDP algorithms.
5. Traditional PDP models have no room to accommodate the known com-
plexity of biological neurons. The whole vision of the brain as a collective-
distributed-dynamical system built from simple ”atomic” neurons is incon-
sistent with the modern neurobiological data (Kandel and Spenser, 1968;
Kandel, Jessel, and Schwartz, 2000; Nichols, Martin, Wallace, 1992, Byrne,
1987). A single neuron is a complex integrated computing element. The
brain has many different types of neurons tailored for different tasks.
2.7 Introducing E-states: Model AF-1
The basic architecture of Model AF-1 is shown in Figure 9. As compared with
Model AF-0, this model has two additional procedures: BIAS and NEXT E–
STATE PROCEDURE. Both these procedures are included in the block EXCI-
TATION.
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DECODING: compare input vector with all vectors in Input LTM
for(i = 1; i <= n; i++) s[i] = Similarity(x[∗], gx[∗][i]); (1)
BIAS: calculate biased similarity. Coefficients a and b determine, respectively,
the additive and the multiplicative biassing effect of the ”residual excitation” e[i].
for(i = 1; i <= n; i++) se[i] = s[i] + a ∗ e[i] + b ∗ s[i] ∗ e[i]); (2)
CHOICE: select the set of locations with the maximum value of se[i]
MAXSET := {i | se[i] = max(se[1], . . . se[n])}; (3)
randomly select a winner (win) from MAXSET
win :∈MAXSET ; (4)
ENCODING: read output vector from the selected location, win, of Out-
put LTM
if(s[win] > xinh) y[∗] = gy[∗][win]; else y[∗] = NULL; (5)
NEXT E-STATE PROCEDURE: calculate next E-state
r[1]
(STM and ITM)
OUTPUT
CENTERS
DECODING
(Input LTM)
ENCODING
(Output LTM)
y[*] gy[*][i]
C  H  O  I  C  E
E  X  C  I  T  A  T  I  O  N
s[i]
se[i]
r[i]
ym[*]
yt[*]
x[*]
TEACHER
gx[*][i]
xinh
gy[*][1] gy[*][n]
gx[*][n]gx[*][1]
s[1] s[n]
r[n]
se[n]se[1]
E−states
Figure 9: The general architecture of Model AF-1
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for(i = 1; i <= n; i++) (6)
if(s[i] > e[i]) e[i] = s[i]; //instant charge
else e[i] = e[i] ∗ (tau− 1)/tau; //discharge with the time constant tau
LEARNING: calculate next state of LTM (G-state)
if(wen) {gx[∗][wptr] = x[∗];
gy[∗][wptr] = y[∗]; wptr ++; } (7)
For the sake of concreteness let us define the following similarity function:
float Similarity(int ∗ x, int ∗ g) (8)
{
float s;
int j, k;
s = 0; k = 0;
for(j = 1; j <= m; j ++)
{if(x[j] == g[j] && x[j] ! = 0) s++;
if(x[j] ! = 0) k ++; }
if(k > 0) s / = k; else s = 0;
return s;
}
Note. The Similarity() is equal to the number of non-zero matches (x[j] =
g[j] 6= 0) divided by the number of non-zero components of input vector (x[j] 6= 0).
Many other similarity functions, satisfying the correct decoding condition – Sec-
tion 2.2, Expression (15) – would work as well.
2.8 Dynamic reconfiguration: ”many symbolic machines
in one”
Model AF-1 uses a very simple mechanism of EXCITATION (expressions (2) and
(6)). This simple mechanism is sufficient to illustrate some important effect asso-
ciated with the introduction of E-states.
Terminology. The pair (gx[*][*],gy[*][*]) will be called the program or the table
of associations of Model AF-1. The pair (gx[*][i],gy[*][i]) will be called the i− th
command (the i− th association) of the program (the table of associations). The
number of commands in a program will be called the length of the program.
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It is easy to prove the following result:
Let C(X,Y) be a class of combinatorial machines with the input alphabet
X and the output alphabet Y. Model AF-1 with a fixed program of the length
|X| · |Y| (or greater) can be changed (reconfigured) into any machine from class
C(X,Y) by changing its E-state, e[∗].
Proof. Let the program (gx[∗][∗], gy[∗][∗]) contain at least once each pair
from X×Y, and let N(M) be the subset of locations containing all commands
of a combinatorial machine M from the above class. Let τ ≫ 1. Let e[i] = 1 if
i ∈ N(M), and e[i] = 0 otherwise. Model AF-1 with this program and this E-state
will simulate machine M.
This result illustrates the importance of E-states. Model AF-0 with a program
of the length |X| can simulate a single combinatorial machine from C(X,Y). To
simulate a different machine, this model must be reprogrammed. Model AF-1
with a program of the length |X| · |Y| can simulate any machine from the above
class without reprogramming.
Example. Let C(X,Y) be the class of all logic functions with m inputs and
one output, that is, X = {0, 1}m and Y = {0, 1}. Model AF-1 with a fixed
program of the length 2m can be reconfigured into any of the 2N possible logic
functions, where N = 2m.
Why is it better to reconfigure than to reprogram? This critically important
question will be discussed in Part II of this paper.
3 Molecular Interpretation of E-states: Ensem-
bles of Protein Nanomachines as Statistical
Mixed-signal Computers
What can be a meaningful neurobiological interpretation of the phenomenological
E-states? How can nontrivial next E-state procedures be implemented in neural
networks?
This section presents a formalism that offers an answer to these questions.
The formalism can be viewed as a system theoretical extrapolation of the main
idea of the Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) theory that the sodium and potassium
ion channels, embedded in the axon membrane, work as stochastic switches with
several internal states (conformations). The formalism was discussed in Eliashberg
(1989, 1990a, and 2003).
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3.1 Concept of protein molecule machine (PMM)
DEFINITION. A Protein Molecule Machine (PMM) is an abstract probabilistic
computing system (X,Y,S, α, ω), where
• X and Y are the sets of real input and output vectors, respectively
• S= {s0, ..sn−1} is a finite set of states
• α : X×S×S→ R′ is a function describing the input-dependent conditional
probability densities of state transitions, where α(x, si, sj)dt is the condi-
tional probability of transfer from state sj to state si during time interval
dt, where x ∈ X is the value of input, and R′ is the set of non-negative
real numbers. The components of x are called generalized potentials. They
can be interpreted as membrane potential, and concentrations of different
neurotransmitters.
• ω : X × S → Y is a function describing output. The components of y ∈ Y
are called generalized currents. They can be interpreted as ion currents, and
the flows of second messengers.
Let x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, s ∈ S be, respectively, the values of input, output, and state at
time t, and let Pi be the probability that s = si. The work of a PMM is described
as follows:
dPi
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
α(x, si, sj)Pj − Pi
∑
j 6=i
α(x, sj, si) (1)
at t = 0
n−1∑
i=0
Pi = 1 (2)
y = ω(x, s) (3)
j0 n−1i
Input
x y= ω(x,s)
Output
i, dtdp α=ij (x,s )Psj j
j,jidp = α(x,s si)P dti
s=s i
Current state
Pi Pj
Figure 10: Protein molecule as a probabilistic nanomachine
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Summing the right and the left parts of (1) over i = 0, ..n− 1 yields
d(
∑n−1
i=0 Pi)
dt
= 0 (4)
so the condition (2) holds for any t.
The internal structure of a PMM is shown in Figure 10, where dpij is the proba-
bility of transition from state sj to state si during time interval dt. The output
y = ω(x, s) is a function of input and the current state.
For the probability of transition from state sj to state si we have
dpij = α(x, si, sj)Pjdt (5)
It follows from (1) that
dPi =
∑
j 6=i
(dpij − dpji) (6)
3.2 Example: Voltage-Gated Ion Channel as a PMM
Ion channels are studied by many different disciplines: biophysics, protein chem-
istry, molecular genetics, cell biology and others (see Hille, 2001). I am concerned
with the information processing (computational) possibilities of ion channels.
I postulate that, at the information processing level, ion channels (as well as
some other membrane proteins) can be treated as PMMs. That is, at this level,
the exact biophysical and biochemical mechanisms are not important. What is
important are the properties of ion channels as abstract machines.
This situation can be meaningfully compared with the general relationship be-
tween statistical physics and thermodynamics. Only some properties of molecules
of a gas (e.g., the number of degrees of freedom) are important at the level of
thermodynamics. Similarly, only some properties of protein molecules are impor-
tant at the level of statistical computations implemented by the ensembles of such
molecules.
The general structure of a voltage-gated ion channel is shown schematically
in Figure 11a. Figures 11b and 11c show how this channel can be represented as
a PMM. In this example the PMM has five states s ∈ {0, 1, ..4}, a single input
x = V (the membrane potential) and a single output y = I (the ion current).
Using the Goldman-Hodgkin-Katz (GHK) current equation we have the fol-
lowing expression for the output function ω(x, s).
Ij = ω(V, j) =
pjz
2FV ′(C in − Coute−zV
′
)
1− e−zV ′
(7)
where
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Figure 11: Ion channel as a PMM
• Ij is the ion current in state s = j with input x = V
• pj [cm/sec] is the permeability of the channel in state s = j
• z is the valence of the ion (z = 1 for K+ and Na+, z = 2 for Ca++)
• F = 9.6484 · 104 [C/mol] is the Faraday constant
• V ′ = V F
RT
is the ratio of membrane potential to the thermodynamic potential,
where T [K] is the absolute temperature, and R = 8.3144 [J/K · mol] is the
gas constant
• C in and Cout [mol] are the cytoplasmic and extracellular concentrations of
the ion, respectively
One can make different assumptions about the function α(x, sj , si), describ-
ing the conditional probability densities of state transitions. It is convenient to
represent this function as a matrix of voltage dependent coefficients aij(V ).
α =


a00(V ) .. a0j(V ) .. a0m(V )
ai0(V ) .. aij(V ) .. aim(V )
am0(V ) .. amj(V ) .. amm(V )

 (8)
where m = n− 1. Note that the diagonal elements of this matrix are not used in
equation (1).
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In the model of spike generation discussed in Eliashberg (1990a) both sodium,
Na+, and potassium, K+ channels were treated as PMMs with five states shown
in Figure 11. Coefficients a10, a21, a32 where assumed to be sigmoid functions of
membrane potential, and coefficients a43 and a04 - constant. In the case of the
sodium channel, s = 3 was used as a high permeability state, and s = 4 was used
as inactive state. In the case of potassium channel, s = 3 and s = 4 were assumed
to be high permeability states.
3.3 Concept of an Ensemble of Protein Molecule Machines
(EPMM)
DEFINITION. An Ensemble of Protein Molecule Machines (EPMM) is a set of
identical independent PMMs with the same input vector, and the output vector
equal to the sum of output vectors of individual PMMs. The structure of an
EPMM is shown in Figure 12, where N is the total number of PMMs, yk is the
output vector of the k-th PMM, and y is the output vector of the EPMM. We
have
y =
N∑
k=1
yk (9)
Let Ni denote the number of PMMs in state s = i (the occupation number of
y
1 PMM i PMM N
y1 yi yN
x
PMM
Figure 12: The structure of EPMM
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state i). Instead of (9) we can write
y =
n−1∑
i=0
Niω(x, si) (10)
Ni (i = 0, ...n−1) are random variables with the binomial probability distributions
P{Ni = m} =
(
m
N
)
Pmi (1− Pi)
N−m (11)
Ni has the mean µi = NPi and the variance σ
2
i = NPi(1− Pi).
Let us define the relative number of PMMs in state s = i (the relative occupation
number of state i) as
ei =
Ni
N
(12)
The behavior of the average ei is described by the equations similar to (1)
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Figure 13: E-states as the numbers of PMM’s in different states
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and (2).
dei
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
α(x, si, sj)ej − ei
∑
j 6=i
α(x, sj, si) (13)
at t = 0
n−1∑
i=0
ei = 1 (14)
The average output y is equal to the sum of average outputs for all states.
y = N
n−1∑
i=0
ω(x, si)ei (15)
The standard deviation for ek is equal to
σk =
√
Pk(1− Pk)/N (16)
Figure 13 illustrates the implementation of E-states as relative occupation
numbers of the states of a PMM. The maximum number of independent E-state
variables is equal to n−1. The number is reduced by one because of the additional
equation (14).
3.4 EPMM as a Robust Mixed-Signal Computer
An EPMM can serve as a robust analog computer with the input–controlled coef-
ficient matrix shown in Figure 14. Because some coefficients in this matrix can
ek
en−1
0e
(x,s ,sk)jα
(x,sk,s0)α (x,sk,sn−1)α
Input−controlled
coefficient matrix
Figure 14: EPMM as an analog computer with an input–controlled coefficient
matrix
34
change sharply (almost step-wise) as functions of inputs (e.g., the membrane po-
tential), an EPMM can be better characterized as a mixed-signal computer. The
statistical molecular implementation of this computer is extremely robust, since
all the characteristics of the whole computer are determined by the properties of
a single PMM.
It is interesting to emphasize that the matrix of input dependent coefficients
is implemented as the matrix of input dependent probabilities, so no external
connections are needed. It would be very difficult (if at all possible) to reach this
level of microminiaturization and this level of reliability using traditional VLSI
techniques.
3.5 On conformational dynamics and chemical kinetics
When a neural modeler needs to simulate different effects of cellular STM, he/she
usually assumes that these effects are associated with chemical kinetics and/or
with the accumulation of different neurotransmitters and/or ions in different cel-
lular compartments. This approach to cellular STM encounters serious problems:
1. It is difficult to justify sufficiently big time constants – chemical kinetics is
quite fast, and cellular compartments are very small.
2. It is difficult to justify nontrivial nonlinearities. For example, it is difficult
to get different time constants for increase (charge) and decrease (discharge)
of an STM variable.
3. It is difficult (if not impossible) to get nontrivial timing effects, e.g., different
results for different order of input events.
All these possibilities are readily available with the EPMM formalism that deals
with sophisticated conformational dynamics rather than with a relatively simple
chemical kinetics.
IMPORTANT! To avoid common misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that
conformational dynamics has nothing to do with traditional chemical kinetics.
Conformational dynamics is determined by the biophysical properties of protein
molecules. No chemistry is involved, for example, in the case of voltage controlled
channels. Even in the case of ligand controlled channels or enzymes it is inadequate
to think about the interaction between a neurotransmitter molecule and a protein
molecule as a chemical reaction. Protein molecules are very big (> 50,000 Dal-
ton), whereas neurotransmitter molecules are tiny (<100 Dalton). A tiny molecule
changes the conformation of a big molecule, so the latter can temporarily open its
pore (as in the case of an ion channel) or become a catalyst producing a second
messenger. (See, for example, Changeux, 1993, and Hille, 2001.)
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Figure 15: Two EPMMs interacting via (a) electrical and (b) chemical messages
3.6 What can be computed with EPMM’s?
Very little is known about the properties of different membrane proteins to rep-
resent them as abstract probabilistic nanomachines. The best studied are the
sodium and potassium channels used in the classical Hodgkin and Huxley (1952)
model for the generation of nerve spike. It is believed that these protein molecules
have close to five different states each. In this specific case, the EPPM formalism
gives a good approximation of the available experimental data (Eliashberg, 1990a,
2003). Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that this formalism should work
well in many other less studied cases.
A single neuron can have several different EPMMs interacting via electrical
messages (membrane potential) and chemical messages (different kinds of neuro-
transmitters). As mentioned in Section 3.2, the Hodgkin-Huxley (1952) model
can be naturally expressed in terms of two EPMMs (corresponding to the sodium
and potassium channels) interacting via common membrane potential (see Figure
15a). Figure 15b shows two EPMMs interacting via a second messenger. In this
example, EPMM1 is the primary transmitter receptor and EPMM2 is the second
messenger receptor.
Some examples illustrating nontrivial computational possibilities of the EPMM
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formalism will be discussed in Part II of this paper.
3.7 The main statements
1. The whole human brain is a nonclassical symbolic system – an E-machine
(Eliashberg, 1967, 1979).
2. The popular notion that the brain implements multidimensional real map-
ping is a fallacy. The whole concept of a learning algorithm that optimizes
synaptic weights to create the above mappings is largely irrelevant to the
problem of human learning.
3. The main data storage procedure of the human brain must be universal
– close to ”memorizing raw experience.” Instead of processing data before
placing it in memory, the brain must process ”raw” data dynamically (on
the fly) depending on context. No context-dependent statistics can be pre-
calculated in advance, in principle, because the number of possible contexts
explodes combinatorially.
4. Biological neural networks have the right computational resources to im-
plement the above dynamic approach. The main computational engine of
the brain is the statistical mechanics of protein nanomachines rather than
the ”statistical mechanics of neural networks.” The notion of a neuron as
a simple atomic computing element, employed by the latter approach, is
inconsistent with the available neurobiological data (Kandel and Spenser,
1968; Kandel, Jessel, and Schwartz, 2000; Nichols, Martin, Wallace, 1992,
Byrne, 1987).
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